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THE PEOPLE, Respondent, v. CHARLES E. COLE, 
Appellant. 
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Criminal Law-Evidence-Expert Testimony.-'l'he decisive 
consideration in determining the admissibility of expert 
opinion evidence is whether the subject of inquiry is one of 
such common knowledge that men of ordinary education could 
reach a conclusion as intelligently as the witness or whether, 
on the other hand, the matter is sufficiently beyond common 
experience that the opinion of an expert would assist the trier 
of fact. 
[2] !d.-Evidence-Expert Testimony-Cause of Death.-A doc-
tor's opinion that a fatal wound could not have been self-
inflicted may be admissible, since the trier of fact would not 
ordinarily be in a position to determine, as intelligently as a 
doctor, whether a wound was self-inflicted. 
[3] !d.-Evidence-Expert Testimony-Matters Directly in Issue. 
-Expert testimony is not inadmissible merely because it 
coincides with an ultimate issue of fact. 
[4] !d.-Evidence-Expert Testimony-Cause of Death.-Where 
expert opinion evidence is offered, much must be left to the 
discretion of the trial court, and in a murder prosecution 
there was no abuse of discretion in permitting a pathologist 
who performed the autopsy to express his opinion that the 
gunshot wound suffered by decedent "would be a very unusual 
pattern for a self-inflicted wound." 
[5] !d.-Evidence-Expert Testimony-Weight.-The jurors in a 
murder prosecution are not bound by the opinion of a patholo-
gist who performed the autopsy that the gunshot wound 
suffered by decedent was not self-inflicted, but are free to 
determine the weight to which it is entitled and to disregard 
it if they find it to be unreasonable. (Pen. Code, § 1127b.) 
[6] Homicide-Murder-Malice.-Where the evidence in a mmder 
prosecution warrants a conclusion that defendant killed dece-
[1] See Cal.Jur.2d, Evidence, § 289 et seq.; Am.Jur., Evidence, 
§ 775 et seq. 
[2] See Cal.Jur.2d, Evidence, § 335; Am.Jur., Evidence, § 867 
et seq. 
McK. Dig. References: [1] Criminal Law,§ 554; [2, 4] Criminal 
Law,§ 555(6); [3] Criminal Law,§ 556; [5] Criminal Law,§ 562; 
[6] Homicide, § 13; [7, 10] Homicide, § 168; [8, 9] Homicide, 
§ 145; [11] Homicide, § 193. 
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[9] Id.-Evidence.-Evidence in a murder prosecution that defend-
ant took a woman's gun, used it in the killing, brought 
the body to her represented that decedent had shot 
herself, asked the woman to accompany him on a trip to 
another where he left the body in high grass beside 
the road, requested her to of the gun used in the 
killing and instructed her not to disclose their activities but 
to give such an account of events as would substantiate his 
subsequent claim that he had last seen decedent driving away 
from a theater with another man, was sufficient to show that 
he planned to implicate the woman so as to secure her assist-
ance in concealing his guilt and that he had formed this plan 
before committing the crime. 
[10] !d.-Evidence-Deliberation and Premeditation.-A showing 
of motive in a murder prosecution indicating that the killing 
was planned, such as that while defendant was living with 
the woman he killed he planned to marry another woman who 
had a substantial bank account and from whom he borrowed 
money, is evidence to a finding of deliberation 
and premeditation. 
[11] !d.-Instructions-Participation in O:ffense.-The trial court 
in a murder prosecution did not err in refusing to instruct 
the jury that a woman other than the woman who was killed 
was an accomplice as a matter of where the question of 
complicity was one of fact and its determination was left 
to the jury under instructions which fully and correctly set 
forth the rules of law to be 
APPEAL a Court of So-
Joseph 
§ 172 et seq.; Am.Jur., Homicide, 
GIBSOX, C. of fir:;t 
murder and life imprisonment. 
'l'he principal are whether 
trial court erred m 11 pon the admissibility of 
evidence and whether the evidence sufficient to support the 
verdict. 
The body of the victim, l\Irs. Helen was found near 
road in Sutter County on the afternoon of November 15, 
1954. Dr. Paxton, a pathologist, examined the body and per-
formed an autopsy. He testified that Mrs. Roberts was an 
obese woman about 50 years of age, that her death was 
eaused by a gunshot wound, and that the fatal bullet, which 
he removed from the body, had entered below the left armpit 
and had traveled across the thorax, with a slight deviation 
backward and upward, pt~netrating the heart, right lung, and 
soft tissue beneath the shoulder and the humerus 
of the right arm three inches below the shoulder joint. 
Defendant did not at the and there is no 
substantial conflict in the evidence. In of 1954 Mrs. 
Hoberts abandoned her husband and living with defend-
ant in various motels under fictitious names. Late in the 
afternoon of November 14, defendant and Mrs. Roberts drove 
away in a station wagon from a Vallejo motel where they 
were then staying. About 6 :30 p.m. they stopped in front 
of a grocery store which Mrs. Roberts entered. I ... ater defend-
nnt got out of the car, and a young man named Shelton made 
remark about the damp weather. Defendant drew an auto-
rnatic pistol from his belt, pointed it at the sky, asked 
>vhether he should do something about the ,;v·eather, replaced 
the gtm under his coat and went into the store. Shelton 
testified that the gun looked like the weapon identified at 
the trial as the one which fired the shot killing lVIrs. Roberts. 
\vhen defendant and Mrs. Hoberts left the store, they drove 
across the street to a service station, where, before leaving 
together, they talked to the attendant for approximately 20 
102 [47 C.2d 
Mrs. Hoberts was 
in alHl drfendant was solemn. 
For several months prior to November defendant inter~ 
a room which he rented in Vallejo at the 
home of a Mrs. Hill, an elderly widow who had agreed to 
marry him. Early in the afternoon of that day, he came 
to visit Mrs. Hill and left after about two hours. He returned 
at 9 p.m., and, when Mrs. Hill opened the door, he exclaimed, 
''Helen shot herself, Helen shot herself.'' He told Mrs. Hill 
that Mrs. Roberts, while in the station wagon, took a gun 
out of the glove compartment, said, "I ought to shoot you 
and the dog and myself,'' pointed the gun at herself and fired 
lhe fatal shot. 
Mrs. Hill and defendant went out to the station wagon 
in front of the house, and the body of Mrs. Roberts, which was 
still warm, was on the front seat. They drove to a point in 
Sutter County, where defendant left the body in high grass 
beside the road. Upon returning to Vallejo, they went to the 
motel where defendant and Mrs. Roberts had been staying. 
Defendant awakened the motel owner in order to obtain a 
key, stating that "mama" had gone to the movies with another 
man and that, if she came back and wanted to reach defend-
ant, he would be at Mrs. Hill's residence. After collecting his 
belongings, he drove with Mrs. Hill to her home. 
Defendant cautioned Mrs. Hill not to reveal their activities 
of that evening and instructed her to say that he had left 
Mrs. Roberts at a theater, arranging to return for her at 
9 p.m., but that, when he and Mrs. Hill went to the theater 
at that hour, Mrs. Roberts entered a car with another man 
and drove away. He gave Mrs. Hill a gun, requesting that 
she dispose of it, and she wrapped it up and asked one of her 
boarders to drop it in the bay. The boarder became suspicious 
and turned the gun over to the police. \Vhen questioned by 
the authorities, defendant stated that he and Mrs. Roberts 
left their motel in Vallejo on the afternoon of November 14, 
that, after stopping at a grocery store, he took her to a 
theater and that, when he returned for her, he saw her drive 
away with another man. 
The gun which defendant gave Mrs. Hill after the death 
of Mrs. Roberts was introduced in evidence and was identified 
by a ballistics expert as the one which fired the bullet removed 
from Mrs. Roberts' body. Mrs. Hill testified that the gun 
looked like one which belonged to her. She said that about 
six weeks before the death of Mrs. Roberts she had given 
Oct. 1956] PEOPLE v. CoLE 
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her gun to defendant to be cleaned and that he returned it in 
about a week. She placed it on the dresser in her bedroom, 
and later she noticed that it had disappeared. She could not 
say on what day she first became aware that it was missing 
but stated that it disappeared sometime during the week 
preceding Mrs. Roberts' death. 
The first question is whether the trial court erred in ruling 
on the admissibility of evidence. Upon called as a wit-
ness, Dr. Paxton, who performed the autopsy, testified that 
he specialized in pathology and autopsy work to determine 
(•auses of death. Defendant stipulated to the qualifications 
of the witness. \Vhen the doctor was asked whether, in his 
opinion, the wound could have been self-inflicted, defendant 
objected on the grounds that no foundation had been laid 
as to the qualifications of the witness to form such an opinion 
and that the matter was not a proper subject for expert 
testimony. The objection was overruled, and the doctor testified 
that ''This would be a very unusual pattern for a self-inflicted 
wound.'' In elaborating, he referred to the location of the 
wound, the course of the bullet and the obesity of the victim, 
and he stated that it would be difficult for a person, whether 
right-handed or left-handed, to hold the muzzle of a gun 
against himself in the position necessary to produce such a 
wound. He testified that his opinion was based on his 
training and experience, as well as the condition of the body, 
that he had examined suicide victims who had died of 
gunshot wounds and that he had never seen a self-inflicted 
wound ''in this position.'' 
Many cases have set forth the general principles to be 
applied in considering the admissibility of expert opinion 
on the question whether a wound was self-inflicted. [1] Al-
though courts have not always used the same language, the 
decisive consideration in determining the admissibility of 
expert opinion evidence is whether the subject of inquiry 
is one of such common knowledge that men of ordinary edu-
cation could reach a conclusion as intelligently as the witness 
or whether, on the other hand, the matter is sufficiently 
beyond common experience that the opinion of an expert 
would assist the trier of fact. (Sec Oeorge v. Bekins Van & 
8toraye Cu., :3~1 Cal.2d 8:34, 844 J20G P.2d 10:l7j; Yalle.io etc. 
R. R. Co. v. Reed Orchard Co., 169 Cal. 545, 570-571 [147 
P. 238]; Howland v. Oakland C. St. Ry. Co., 110 CaL 513, 
Ci22 [42 P. 983]; Wells 'l'nrclnrays, Ltd. v. Cebrian, 122 Cal. 
104 [47 C.2d 
wound could have been self-
inflicted was admissible. 65 Conn. 265 [30 A. 
1110, 1113-1114, 48 27 L.R.A. 498] ; Everett 
v. State, 62 Ga. 71; State v. 85 Kan. 334 [116 
P. 823, 824] ; State v. 145 La. 891 [83 So. 181, 182] ; 
State v. Knight, 43 Me. 11, 131; Commonwealth v. Spiropoulos, 
208 Mass. 71 N.E. 451, ; illiera v. Terr·itory, 13 N.M. 
192 [81 P. People v. ·wilson, 109 N.Y. 345 [16 
N.E. 540, 543] ; Commonwealth v. Puglise, 276 Pa. 235 [120 
A. 401, 402].) 'I' he reasoning underlying these decisions is 
that the subject of self-inflicted wounds is not one of such 
common that may not be assisted by the 
opinion of a doctor, who has special knowledge regarding 
anatomy and injuries to the human body. 
\V e are aware that cases in some jurisdictions have held 
tlwt testimony of this is not admissible. (Treat v. JJ1 er-
chanfs' 198 431 N.E. 992, 994] ; Knights 
Templars' & Masons' Life Indem. Co. v. Crayton, 110 Ill. 
App. 648, 662-663; Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Ka·iser, 115 Ky. 
539 [74 S.W. 208, 205] [overruled on other grounds in 
Inter-Southern Life Ins. Co. Hinkle's 226 Ky. 724 
[11 S.W.2d 913, 914]] ; Slate v. 196 N.C. 129 [144 S.E. 
698, 699-700] ; State v. 69 N.D. 70 [284 N.W. 209, 
217-218] ; State v. 34 S.C. 136 S.E. 315, 316-317] ; 
State v. McCravy, 183 Tenn. 338 S.W. 165, 168] ; May-
nard v. 15,1 Tex.Crim. 521 S.\V.2d 65, 67] ; 
Metropol~itan Ins. Co. , 50 Tex.Oiv.App. 233 
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64], and People v. Westlake (1882) 62 Cal. 303, 309, are 
readily distinguishable. 'fhey did not involve the question of 
suicide but held that a doctor may not an opinion, based 
on the course of a bullet, as to the posture of a person shot 
by another or as to the relative positions of the victim and 
the one who fired the shot. As pointed out in the Milner 
case, it is impossible to determine those matters from the 
course of the bullet alone, since a number of variables might 
be involved, such as whether the victim was leaning forward 
or standing erect. (See also People v. Salaz, 66 Cal.App. 173, 
183 [225 P. 777].) 
The next question is whether the evidence is sufficient to 
support the verdict of first degree murder. Section 187 of 
the Penal Code defines murder as the unlawful killing of a 
human being with malice aforethought, and section 189 of that 
code provides, in part, that all murder perpetrated by any 
kind of willful, deliberate and premeditated killing is murder 
of the first degree. 
[6] The record clearly warrants a conclusion that defend-
ant killed Mrs. Roberts, and there is nothing showing provo-
cation or justification for the homicide. Under such circum-
stances, malice will be implied. (Pen. Code, § 188.) 
[7] Deliberation and premeditation may be inferred from 
proof of circumstances which will furnish a reasonable founda-
tion for such an inference, and, where the evidence is not 
in law insufficient, the matter is exclusively within the 
province of the jury for determination. (People v. Gitlbrand-
sen, 35 Cal.2d 514, 519-520 [218 P.2d 977] .) [8] There 
was evidence that defendant had secretly taken Mrs. Hill's 
gun from her dresser during the week preceding Mrs. Roberts' 
death, that he was carrying the weapon on his person about 
6 :30 p.m. on the evening she died and that he used it to 
kill Mrs. Roberts sometime before 9 p.m. The jury could 
infer that defendant had taken the gun for the purpose of 
killing her. 
[9] Moreover, the evidence was sufficient to show that 
defendant planned to implicate Mrs. Hill so as to secure 
her assistance in concealing his guilt and that he had formed 
opinion of any expert as conclusive, but should give to it the weight 
to which they shall find it to be entitled. The jury may, however, disregard 
any such opinion, if it shall be found by them to be unreasonable. 
"No further instruction on the subject of opinion evidence nPed be 
given.'' 
1956] PEOPLE v. COLE 
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this plan before committing the crime. It was established 
uot only that he took her gun and used it in the killing but 
also that he brought the body to Mrs. Hill's home, represented 
that Mrs. Roberts had shot herself and asked Mrs. Hill to 
accompany him on the trip to Sutter County where he left 
1 he body in high grass beside the road. Defendant also 
requested Mrs. Hill to dispose of the gun used in the killing 
nnd instructed her not to disclose their activities but to give 
snch au account of events as would substantiate his subsequent 
daim that he had last seen Mrs. Roberts driving away from 
theater with another man. Mrs. Roberts had been seen alive 
two hours before defendant brought her body, which \vas still 
warm, to Mrs. Hill's home. The taking of Mrs. Hill's gun 
during the preceding week and the speed with which defend-
ant acted following the killing would support the conclusion 
that his plan to involve 1\frs. Hill had been conceived before 
the crime was committed. 
[10] There was also evidence that, while defendant was 
living with Mrs. Roberts, who was in financial distress, he 
planned to marry Mrs. Hill, who had a substantial bank 
account and owned a home and other property. During the 
period that defendant was living with Mrs. Roberts he bor-
rowed money from Mrs. Hill, and on the day of the killing 
l1e represented to the owner of the motel where he was staying 
that property belonging to JYirs. Hill was owned by him and 
expressed a desire to ascertain the feasibility of locating a 
service station on it. The jury might have determined that 
defendant had become dissatisfied with the relationship exist-
ing between him and Mrs. Roberts and that he planned to 
kill her in order to remove her a.s an obstacle to his plan of 
obtaining Mrs. Hill's property through marriage. A showing 
of motive indicating that the killing was planned is evidence 
tending to support a finding of deliberation and premedita-
tion. For example, in People v. Gulbrandsen, supra, 35 Cal. 
2d 514, where we held that deliberation and premeditation 
1vere sufficiently shown, we relied, in part, on evidence tha.t 
the defendant's motive in killing the two victims was to get 
them out of the way so that he could force himself upon a 
woman. (See also People v. Werner, 111 Cal.App.2d 264, 
272 [244 P.2c1476].) 
The evidence is sufficient to support the j nry 's finding that 
defendant was possessed of a willful, deliberate and premedi-




have been a proper 
e:s:amina-
for a self-
not know wildher deceased was 
but that upon him-
inflicted the wound) it would be 
110 C.2d 
difficult to inflict such a wound upon himself with either 
hand. It appears to me that in the absence of showing some 
similarity or defined dissimilarity between the doctor's and 
the decedent's pertinent capabilities, the doctor's testimony 
concerning himself would be immaterial. On cross-examina-
tion the doctor testified that he had not measured the de-
ceased's anns. 'l'he basis of the doctor's opinion that the 
'vound was not self-inflicted was then brought ont: he had 
examined by autopsy "perhaps twenty people" who died 
from gunshot wounds and seen ''numerable cases in the 
emergency hospitals which I have worked in''; ''I can form 
an opinion from my past experiences in examining the suicidal 
victims . . . and I would say that ninety percent of the sui-
cidal victims I have examined have shot themselves in the 
head ... And a majority of those are in the right temple ... 
The next most common site is through the mouth ... The 
next most common site is an attempt at the heart ... and I 
have never seen one in this position .... The location in my 
opinion indicates that this is not self-inflicted." 
The basis of the doctor's opinion as expressed in his 
testimony shows that there was not adequate factual founda-
tion for, and that he was not qualified to express, the opinion 
above quoted. It was of no concern to the jury, and not 
helpful to them, to know that "ninety percent of the suicidal 
victims" examined by Dr. Paxton had "shot themselves in 
the head'' rather than shot themselves in certain other places 
or, it may be interpolated, had jumped off bridges or hit them-
selves over the hrad with axes. The case here concerned 
the woman who did die from the wound in the chest described 
aboYe. 'l'he question for the jury was whether that particular 
wound was inflicted by decedent or by another person. Since 
the prosecution had not, before the doctor gave his opinion, 
shown a factual base upon which the doctor as a pathologist 
could intelligently and reasonably form and support the 
opinion that the wound here involved was not self-inflicted/ 
that opinion should not have been received in evidence. The 
error of receiving it became more apparent when on his cross-
examination it developed that he had no basis for an opinion 
that this particular woman could not have shot herself as she 
was shot. However, as stated above, it does not appear to me, 
1 The evidence contains no suggestion that the doctor was acquainted 
with the decedent in her lifetime and knew her character as evidencing 
a propensity to commit an act such as suicide in a conventional rather 
than unusual manner. 
1956] PEOPI~E v. COLE 
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that the error 
Accordingly I concur in the judgment and, generally, in 
the other propositions of law discussed in the opinion of the 
Chief ,Justice. 
CAHTEH, J., Concurring and Dissenting.--In view of the 
record before us in this case, I am of the opinion that it was 
error to permit Dr. Paxton to expres::; an opinion that the 
wound inflicted upon the victim of the homicide "would be 
a very unusual pattern for a self-inflicted wound.'' I think 
is clear that, even conceding that the subject matter of the 
inquiry might be within the realm of expert testimony, suffi-
eient foundation was not laid for the opinion of an expert 
on this subject. Ordinarily, expert testimony is based upon 
a fnll and fair :statement of all of the pertinent facts rPlating 
to the problem on which the expert is called upon to give 
his opinion. Here, vital and material facts were omitted 
from the statement and were not within the knowledge of the 
l'xpert. The::;e facts rdatc to the le11gth of the vietim 's arms 
and the character and quality of the clothing, if any, worn 
by the victim at the time the shot was fired. 
A basic objection to expert opinion evidence in a case such 
as this is, that the expert is called upon to answer the exact 
question which is to be determined by the trier of fact, and 
therefore invades its province. Obviously, if the wound here 
was self-inflicted, the defendant did not fire the shot, and 
would therefore not be guilty of the offense charged. If the 
wound were not self-inflicted, its infliction could be traced 
directly to defendant. 
In my opinion the proper procedure in a case such as 
this would be for the prosecution to develop all of the facts 
with respect to the location of the point of entry of the bullet, 
its course through the body of the victim and the probable 
distance from the body of the muzzle of the gun at the time 
it was discharged together with physical facts relative to 
the size of the victim, clothing worn, length of her arms and 
ability to move her museles, and leave the qurstion as to who 
inflicted the wound for the determination of the trier of fact. 
Tt seems to me that upon the presentation of such a factual 
situation, anyone familiar with the nse of firearms is as 
(•apable of an·iving at an opinion as to whether or not the 
wonnd was srlf-intlietPtl as a so-called expert in this field. 
No. Bank. Oct. 5, 
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